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Insights provided by behavioural economics will help inform
more effective tax reform policies
Andrew Leicester, Peter Levell and Imran Rasul of the IFS discuss new research into people’s
behavioural responses to policy. They argue for developing the evidence base that show the importance of
behavioural responses, thus informing more effective tax and welfare policies. 
Recent years have seen a rapid expansion of  interest in behavioural economics, which draws on ideas
f rom psychology to shape economic theory. A burgeoning body of  evidence “both f rom experimental
laboratory studies and out in the f ield” suggests that behavioural insights can help to better explain
observed behaviours. This observation considers three ways in which behavioural economics might be
important f or the design, implementation and ref orm of  tax and benef it policy.
First, as we discuss in much more depth in new research f unded by the Nuf f ield Foundation,
behavioural insights help in thinking about how people respond to policy. The way taxes and benef its are
presented (even in seemingly trivial ways like their name) can have an ef f ect on their impact: previous
IFS research has demonstrated that Winter Fuel Payments are much more likely to be spent on gas and
electricity than unlabelled income. People may also respond dif f erently as policies become more
complicated, perhaps because they resort to simpler rules of  thumb to guide decisions when things
become hard to process. For example, there is evidence  that people conf use marginal tax rates (how
much of  the next pound earned will be taken in tax) with average tax rates (how much of  everything
earned is taken in tax) when deciding how much to work, perhaps because average rates are easier to
understand if  the structure of  marginal rates is complicated.
Second, behavioural insights could help explain why tax reform is of ten hard to implement, despite the
evidence set out in the recent Mirrlees Review of  the likely benef its of  sensible ref orms. The Review
made the case that policymakers should think about ref orm in the context of  the whole tax and benef it
system, when thinking about issues like progressivity or work incentives f or example. However,
experimental evidence  has f ound that people suf f er f rom a phenomenon known as “disaggregation
bias”: a tendency to f ocus on individual components of  something rather than the whole. Since taxes and
benef its interact in a number of  ways, ref orms to the system inevitably involve changes to dif f erent
component parts amongst which the big picture ef f ects can be lost. For example, expanding the base of
VAT and using other taxes and benef its to compensate low income households could help improve the
overall ef f iciency of  the tax system and leave it as progressive as bef ore on average. But the regressive
nature of  the VAT ref orm in isolation would almost certainly be the f ocus of  attention of  such a change
and make the package of  ref orm less acceptable. Governments may respond to disaggregation bias on
the part of  voters, but policymakers may well suf f er the same bias themselves since their attention is
of ten f ocused on a single aspect of  the wider system.
Behavioural f actors can also mean that even small tax changes are sometimes hard to implement. The
model of prospect theory suggests that people f eel a loss much more acutely than a gain of
equivalent size, and that the additional pain caused by larger losses gets smaller and smaller. As a result,
lots of  small tax increases could be perceived as more costly than a single big rise. This could help
explain why tax escalators, which increase tax rates by a small amount year af ter year, have of ten not
been implemented as planned. Similar issues might even have some resonance f or why recent attempts
to impose the f ull rate of  VAT on (amongst other things) takeaway pasties and f ixed holiday caravans
(raising probably less than £100 million) f ailed, whereas a £12 billion increase in the VAT rate went ahead.
Finally, as the IFS has long argued, tax and benef it policy should be based as f ar as possible on good
evidence. This is equally true in thinking about what behavioural insights mean f or policy, and our
research looks in detail at the evidence base. Some recent evidence has come f rom policy trials looking
at the impact of  ‘nudges’ which relate to aspects of  tax policy. For example, HMRC and the Behavioural
Insights Team at the Cabinet Of f ice conducted an experiment  with the wording of  letters sent to
people asking them to pay outstanding taxes. People receiving a letter telling them about compliance
rates in their local area were much more likely to respond quickly than those sent a generic letter,
suggesting a role f or ‘social norms’ af f ecting behaviour. Such f indings help us to understand the
usef ulness of  behavioural insights in making aspects of  tax policy more ef f ective, and we applaud the
growing use of  controlled experiments in this way.
However, behavioural economics is not just about developing ways to nudge people, and our research
makes it clear that these wider insights are important f or tax and benef it policy more generally. The most
pressing evidence gap relates to measuring the welf are costs of  getting policy ‘wrong’ by not taking
behavioural insights into account. For example, how much higher are optimal cigarette taxes if  people
cannot commit to giving up? Are back-to-work bonuses or benef it sanctions more ef f ective to stop
people procrastinating when searching f or work and how large should they be? What will the new system
of  Universal Credit mean f or people’s perception of  stigma in the benef its system and take-up rates?
The challenge going f orward theref ore seems to be developing the evidence base to answer these sorts
of  questions. This will involve three elements: 1) caref ully considering how behavioural issues might
impact on policy at the design stage 2) ensuring that policy evaluation (as f ar as possible) allows us to
disentangle potentially conf licting behavioural f actors that might drive people to respond to interventions
in dif f erent ways and 3) using the results to develop and ref ine theories of  behaviour.
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